This article is co-authored by partner Andrew Adelman and JGL law clerk Sherise Tracey.
For the first time, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit answered whether an employer’s religious belief allows them to bypass the protections afforded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment decisions based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The decision in Doe v. Catholic Relief Services holds that it does not. This has important implications for LGBTQ+ workers, where religious employers have increasingly tried to use religious justifications to deny or limit LGBTQ+ workplace protections.
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is a nonprofit social services agency affiliated with the Catholic Church, with a mission “to assist the poor and vulnerable overseas.” John Doe (proceeding under a pseudonym) was employed by CRS as an IT analyst and sought to enroll his husband under the company’s health insurance plan, a benefit of his employment with CRS. CRS refused, claiming that doing so is contrary to CRS’s religious values. Doe sued CRS, asserting that its refusal to allow him to enroll his husband in the company’s health insurance plan was discrimination because of his sexual orientation, and thus violated Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex as well as Maryland state anti-discrimination law.
The Fourth Circuit held that none of the religious defenses that CRS asserted had merit, and it upheld the district court’s decision that CRS violated Title VII and Maryland law in denying the benefits to Doe’s husband.
In evaluating CRS’s statutory defenses, the Fourth Circuit held that:
- Section 702 of Title VII, which is a carve out that allows religious employers to discriminate on the basis of religion, i.e., to only employ those who share the same religion as them, did not apply. This provision allows an employer to make an employment decision based upon religious preference. It does not, the Fourth Circuit held, “confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.” That also applies even when an employment decision is motivated in part by a religious purpose.
- While Maryland’s anti-discrimination statute also has a religious exemption, it applies only when an employee’s duties directly further the core mission of the religious entity. Doe’s job duties in IT did not advance CRS’s programmatic goal, which made him one or more steps removed from the organization’s mission. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held that his role did not qualify for the Maryland statute’s religious exemption.
- The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) prohibits the government from engaging in conduct that would substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion. However, RFRA applies only to governmental action, and it can only be challenged when the government is party to a lawsuit. Because CRS is a private entity, RFRA cannot serve as a defense.
The Fourth Circuit also addressed CRS’s constitutional arguments, holding that the Constitution did not prohibit enforcement of Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. First, the Fourth Circuit held that the Free Exercise Clause did not apply here because the laws (Title VII and Maryland’s anti-discrimination statute) are neutral and generally applicable. While the Supreme Court has recognized that a law may not be neutral and generally applicable where it allows for individualized exemptions, the Fourth Circuit determined that Title VII and Maryland’s anti-discrimination statute did not fall into that category because they “apply the same exemption threshold to both secular and religious organizations.”
Second, the Fourth Circuit addressed the application of the church autonomy doctrine, which provides that courts must abstain from weighing in on questions “of faith and doctrine,” and allows for self-governance in the same. CRS argued that the employment decision here was based on a religious belief and, thus, that decision was a matter of internal church governance not subject to Title VII. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that religious employers “enter into the same commercial employment relationship as every other employer” and thus submit to the government’s goal of ensuring non-discrimination as provided by Title VII.
Considerations for Employers & Employees
The Fourth Circuit – which covers Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina – has now clarified that religious employers cannot seek to use a religious justification to undermine the statutory requirements of workplace equality. The upshot of this ruling can be separated into two phases: the hiring process and the course of employment.
Religious employers can favor co-religionist candidates in hiring (and firing) and make employment decisions explicitly based on religion, and it can also do so when the candidate will perform a spiritual function. This is true for a range of religious employers, from churches to schools. A minister, or an aid worker (or IT employee in CRS’s case), can be selected for (or excluded from) employment because of their religion.
Once an employee is hired, the decision outlines two takeaways. Religious employers can fire an employee for any reason (even one prohibited by Title VII) when the employee is a “minister” of the organization, e.g., their role is a spiritual one or advances the organization’s core mission. For non-ministerial employees, however, religious employers cannot make decisions about their employment, such as revoking benefits, based on religious reasons if it would otherwise violate Title VII.
The decision has important implications for LGBTQ+ workers, whose rights have been increasingly at the crosshairs of workplace equality. Doe v. Catholic Relief Services reinforces that LGBTQ+ workers are entitled to workplace protections from all employers, no matter their religious beliefs. This ensures continued protection of various identities by not allowing their protected status to be overwritten.
